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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, the risk-free rate’s impact on stock market excess returns was examined. Firstly, 
theoretical arguments were made for that a low risk-free rate might lower the excess return on 
the stock market, since this increases the incentive for fund managers to increase variance of 
returns. Under the assumption that fund managers affect the preferences of the representative 
investor, propositions regarding stock returns and the risk-free rate were made. Using the time 
series of stochastic volatility risk premium estimates created by Bollerslev, Gibson and 
Zhou’s (2011), it was tested if investor risk aversion is lower when the risk-free rate is low. 
The risk-free rate’s impact on the cross-section of stock returns was tested through the same 
methodology used by Black, Jensen, Scholes (1972) with independent variables linked to the 
risk-free rate added. Support for lower risk aversion during periods of a low risk-free rate was 
found. In opposite to the proposition regarding the cross-section of stock returns, the tests 
suggest that excess returns for all portfolios are higher when the risk-free rate is low. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The fund management industry has grown sharply since the 1970s and this development has 
increased their fraction of the stock market activity dramatically. This has resulted in an 
increased possibility for diversification and access to new markets for households, but not 
without introducing other problems. Rajan (2005) points out that discretionary investment 
management creates an agency problem since the fund has an incentive to maximize its 
profits rather than the risk-adjusted returns. This may result in excessive risk taking, the funds 
can increase their expected compensation through increasing the variance of their returns. 
Rajan also points out that the fund industry’s increased fraction of the market should be 
reflected in asset prices. Furthermore, he claims that the incentive to increase variance is 
greater when the risk-free rate is low. However, there is no thorough theoretical discussion or 
empirical evidence for the latter statement in his article.  
     In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the weak state of most developed economies 
combined with unprecedented expansionary monetary policy has resulted in a long period 
with low levels of the risk-free interest rate (risk-free rate). Therefore, the problem described 
is highly relevant for the current state of the financial market. If the agency problem between 
fund investors and fund managers is aggravated when the risk-free rate is low, the investors 
are obviously affected. Moreover, monetary policy makers ought to be aware of the effect that 
monetary stimulus has on the financial market. Finally, corporations should be interested in 
the risk-free rate’s impact on their cost of capital in order to plan their financing activities. 
     Consequently, it should be of great interest to test Rajan’s reasoning empirically and that is 
the aim of this thesis. More specifically, we will examine how the risk-free rate affects stock 
market returns and focus on the impact of a low risk-free rate. In section 2, we will review 
asset pricing and agency theory to establish a foundation for propositions regarding how the 
risk-free rate affects the behavior of stock market returns, assuming that fund managers’ 
preferences affect stock returns. The propositions are deduced in section 3 and regards 
investor risk aversion, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. In section 4, the proposition 
regarding risk aversion will be tested by using a time series of risk aversion estimates created 
by Bollerslev, Gibson and Zhou’s (2011) (henceforth BGZ) and examining the explanatory 
power of variables linked to the risk-free rate. In section 5 we test the proposition regarding 
systematic risk by following Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) (henceforth BJS) and adding 
independent variables linked to the risk-free rate. The proposition regarding idiosyncratic risk 
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will be left untested. In section 6 we will conclude our findings and discuss how they relate to 
the participants mentioned above. 
2. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
2.1 BACKGROUND ON THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Markowitz (1952) is the antecessor of modern portfolio theory. Markowitz states that an 
investor will gain expected return by taking on more variance and consequently a reduction of 
variance lower the expected return of the portfolio. He rejects the law of large numbers, 
unrealistically stating that diversification can be achieved without giving up any expected 
return. The reason why the law of large numbers cannot be applied to stock returns is that 
they are too intercorrelated. Hence, the rule that an investor should maximize discounted 
expected return must also be dismissed. Markowitz presents the expected return–variance of 
returns (E-V) rule. The rule simply remarks that expected return is desirable and variance is 
not. Markowitz points out that when following the (E-V) rule, investors must diversify among 
different industries to avoid covariance between stocks in the same industry. Furthermore, the 
investor must also be aware of the covariance between securities from different industries 
(Markowitz, 1952). 
     In the genesis of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) added two main assumptions to Markowitz portfolio model, based on the mean-
variance choice. The first of the new assumptions is that there is complete agreement among 
investors concerning the joint distribution of asset returns. The second assumption is that all 
investors can borrow and lend money at the risk-free rate (Fama & French, 2004). The first 
assumption implies that the market portfolio must be the mean-variance efficient portfolio, 
since all investors will hold the same portfolio. The second assumption determines the return 
on a zero-beta security, which investors will combine with the market portfolio to adjust the 
risk of the total portfolio. However, risk-free borrowing and lending is an assumption that is 
more or less unrealistic empirically (Fama & French, 2004). Therefore, Black (1972) 
developed a CAPM model similar to the predecessor, except the assumption of risk-free 
borrowing and lending. He showed that variance-efficiency could instead be obtained by 
allowing unrestricted short sales of risky assets. Fama and French (2004) emphasize that the 
CAPM is based on unrealistic assumptions both in the elder and newer versions. However, the 
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model still provides insight into asset pricing and its imperfections gives academics a reason 
to search for improvements. 
 
2.2 MODERN ASSET PRICING THEORY 
In this section we present asset pricing theory based on Cochrane (2000). Cochrane focus on 
consumption-based asset pricing. He points out that although the CAPM was formulated 
before the consumption-based model, the former model is a specialization of the latter. The 
fundament behind consumption-based asset pricing is that the expected discounted payoff 
should determine the price of an asset. The discount factor should correspond to the level 
where the marginal utility loss of consuming less today equals the marginal utility gain of the 
expected proceeds in the future. This can be expressed as: 
(1)                   
        
      
      
Where           represents the expected payoff x at time t+1 given the information set   at 
time t. Throughout the rest of this thesis we will denote this as         .   is an impatience 
coefficient and       is the marginal utility of consumption. The discount factor is represented 
by m: 
(2)                 
        
      
 
The risk correction component of the discount factor should depend on the asset’s covariance 
with marginal utility of consumption. Since the utility of consumption is a decreasing 
function, marginal utility is higher when an individual’s level of consumption is low and vice 
versa. Consequently, an individual will prefer an asset with a high payoff in states where 
overall consumption of the individual is low. Thus, the required excess return of an asset 
should equal:  
(3)                    
      
                
  
           
 
 
Where    represents 1 plus the return of stock i and         . Moreover,    represent 1 
plus the risk-free rate. Throughout this thesis        . As stated in equation 3, the only 
variance that should contribute to the risk premium is the covariance with marginal utility of 
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consumption and this is referred to as systematic risk. Variance uncorrelated with the 
marginal utility of consumption is referred to as idiosyncratic risk and should not receive any 
risk compensation, because only covariance adds variance to an investor’s consumption for 
marginal purchases of an asset. This is shown below where   is the purchased amount of an 
asset with payoff x. For small changes in  , the changes in    become very small and the last 
component of the equation becomes negligible.  
 
(4)                                      
 
If the utility of consumption is assumed to follow a power utility function of  
           then equation 2 can be written as: 
 
(5)           
    
  
    
 
Where   is risk aversion. Then the expected return can be expressed as a function of its 
regression coefficient for changes in consumption (     ): 
 
(6)                               
 
The factor risk premium     can be expressed as: 
 
(7)                      
 
Where   is the risk aversion and         is the variance of consumption growth.      
However, the consumption-based model has not performed well in explaining empirical 
returns. One possible explanation for this is flawed consumption data. Therefore, various 
pricing models have been developed that use a factor to represent marginal utility growth of 
consumption. The most famous factor-pricing model is the CAPM.  The CAPM uses total 
wealth as a proxy for consumption. Hence, expected return of an asset is determined by the 
risk-free rate, the return on total wealth and the asset’s regression coefficient for total wealth. 
 Gardtman & Svensson 
 
8 
 
The latter is known as the the beta value. Moreover, the market portfolio is used as a proxy 
for total wealth. As a result: 
 
(8)     
        
      
              
 
Equation 8 will be used to test the risk-free rate’s impact on the cross-section of stock returns. 
Note that    is the regression coefficient from equation 6 and   is the impatience coefficient 
from equation 1. Using returns on the market portfolio as a proxy for changes in consumption, 
equation 8 can be expressed as a function of risk aversion and variance of the market portfolio 
returns: 
(9)                               
 
2.3 THE REPRESENTATIVE INVESTOR 
Cochrane (2000) shows that the law of one price and absence of arbitrage is sufficient to 
create an equilibrium for stock market returns. However, it is common in the asset pricing 
research to assume that there is a representative investor. This idea was introduced by 
Rubinstein (1974) who addressed the question of finding equilibrium returns when investors’ 
resources, beliefs, and preferences differ. Rubinstein shows that under certain assumptions, a 
composite of the investors’ different resources, beliefs, and preferences can be created and 
that the composite of those variables can be linked to exogenous parameters of the economy. 
Therefore, equilibrium security returns can be determined as if the market did consist of 
individuals with identical resources, beliefs, and preferences. We will not describe the 
assumptions required to prove the algebraic relation. For this thesis, the notion of a 
representative is sufficient to discuss how the difference between fund managers’ and 
individual investors’ preferences might affect stock returns. Rubinstein attributes the 
following characteristics to the representative investor (Rubinstein, 1974, page 234): 
1. “His initial wealth, optimal present consumption, and optimal future wealth for every 
state are arithmetic averages of their corresponding aggregate values” 
2. “Any homogeneous economic characteristic shared by all actual individuals is also an 
economic characteristic of the composite individual” 
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3. “His beliefs for each state are a function of the beliefs of all actual individuals for the 
corresponding state and at most also depend on the tastes of all actual individuals” 
4. “His rate of patience and taste parameters are, respectively, a function of the rates of 
patience and taste parameters of all actual individuals and at most also depend on the 
beliefs of all actual individuals” 
5. “Equilibrium rates of return are determined as if there exist only composite 
individuals” 
 
 Of these characteristics, number 4 will be useful in the rest of this thesis.   
2.4 STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY, A TOOL TO ESTIMATE RISK AVERSION 
From equation 6 and equation 7 it is evident that the factor risk premium for asset returns 
depends on risk aversion and the variance of the factor. However, the variance of the factor is 
not necessarily constant. For example, under the CAPM framework one should also be 
concerned with the volatility of the market portfolio’s variance (see equation 8 and equation 
9). 
     Since the variance of returns is stochastic, this adds another dimension of risk, in effect, 
uncertainty regarding the variance of returns (Carr & Wu, 2009). Various derivatives can be 
used to trade the risk associated with stochastic variance. Consequently, an investor can take a 
position in variance and empirical studies have concluded that the stochastic risk premium is 
negative. This implies that investors are willing to pay a premium to hedge the exposure to 
variance risk in the stock market (Carr & Wu, 2009). 
     The stochastic risk premium can be used to derive an estimation of risk aversion. 
Assuming a linear volatility risk premium and an affine stochastic volatility model result in 
the following relationship (BGZ): 
 
(10)                                
       
      
        
 
Where   represent the stochastic volatility risk premium,        represent marginal utility of 
wealth and therefore         represent changes in marginal utility of wealth. Assume that the 
representative investor has the following power utility function of wealth (BGZ): 
 
 Gardtman & Svensson 
 
10 
 
(11)                            
     
   
   
 
 
Where   represents the impatience coefficient. Moreover, if the representative investor holds 
the market portfolio in equilibrium, then marginal utility of wealth is (BGZ): 
 
(12)                              
     
  
 
 
Moreover, BGZ states that it follows from Itô’s formula that: 
 
(13)                          
       
      
                 
 
Where   is the volatility of the variance and   is the covariance between the Brownian motion 
processes for stock prices and the volatility of stock returns. Combining equation 10 and 
equation 13 yields: 
 
(14)                                     
 
Hence: 
(15)                         
 
  
 
 
Moreover, BGZ’s analysis of S&P500 data finds that        and      . In effect: 
 
(16)                       . 
 
BGZ use this relationship to create a time series of risk aversion estimations through GMM 
estimation. They use model-free volatility measures to calculate risk-neutral implied volatility 
from options on NYSE firms. Moreover, five-minute returns on the S&P500 index are used to 
calculate realized volatility on the stock market. With these inputs, BGZ created a time series 
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of the risk premium for stochastic volatility in S&P500 options through GMM estimation. 
This is used as a time series for risk aversion estimates. 
2.5 EXCESS RETURN OF THE MARKET PORTFOLIO AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
In order to test the risk-free rate’s affect on the cross-section of stock returns, we will use the 
CAPM. Hence, we want to state how the risk-free rate is expected to affect excess return. In 
equation 8, the excess return is formulated as        . The simplest way to calculate 
expected excess return on the market portfolio at a given point in time would be to use the 
historical average of    and subtract the current level of the risk-free rate (Merton, 1980), 
Then the risk-free rate’s impact on a given stock’s returns would be: 
 
(17)                       
              
   
    
  
This follows from: 
 
(18)                                     
 
This assumes that    is independent of the risk-free rate. However, Merton (1980) points out 
two flaws in this approach. Firstly, if this was the case, the factor risk premium could become 
negative during high levels of the risk-free rate. Under this scenario investors would have to 
pay a premium to take on risk and this does not make sense unless investors are risk seeking. 
Secondly, the required return of the market portfolio ought to depend on the level of inflation. 
Since the risk-free rate takes inflation into account, so does the return on the market portfolio 
if it depends on the level of the risk-free rate. Hence, the required return on the market 
portfolio ought to depend on the risk-free rate and therefore the excess return ought to be 
independent of the risk-free rate.  
2.6 EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE CAPM 
Fama and French (2004) criticize the CAPM’s importance because of its poor empirical 
record. The CAPM’s empirical failure may be a result of the simplifying assumptions 
mentioned above, which causes difficulties when being implemented in reality. Earlier 
research of the CAPM test three aspects; (1) If beta is the only variable with explanatory 
power and if stock returns are linearly related to their betas. (2) If the expected return of the 
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market portfolio exceeds the expected return of zero beta assets. (3) If zero-beta assets’ 
expected returns are equal to the risk-free rate and if the beta premium equals the expected 
market return minus the risk-free rate. 
     Fama and French (2004) remark that the relationship between beta and the average returns 
is too flat in the earlier tests of the CAPM. In effect, the return on a zero-beta security is not 
the risk-free rate and the beta risk premium is lower than the excess return of the market 
portfolio. The earlier tests supported the claim that the market portfolio is mean-variance 
efficient and that the beta premium is positive.  
     However, recent tests of the CAPM and the Black version of CAPM provides evidence 
that the beta is not the only factor that explain stock returns (Fama & French, 2004). Using a 
cross-sectional regression, Fama and French (1992) finds evidence for that the following 
variables contribute to stock returns: firm size, the earnings-to-price ratio, the debt-to-equity 
ratio and the book-to-market ratio. 
     Some researchers go as far as saying that the CAPM has never been tested. Roll (1977) 
argues that the market portfolio is empirically and theoretically inadequate, because it is not 
clear which assets that can be excluded. As a result the CAPM use proxies and not the true 
market portfolio. 
2.7 THE SECURITY MARKET LINE AND BETTING AGAINST BETA 
One of the earlier tests of the CAPM was BJS’s article. They carry out empirical tests on all 
securities listed on the New York Stock exchange between 1926 and 1966 to examine 
whether or not the returns are consistent with the CAPM. BJS divide stocks into 10 different 
portfolios based on their beta values. They then regress the excess returns of the portfolios 
with the excess return on the market portfolio as the independent variable. Following from 
equation 8, the regression used is: 
 
(19)       
    
          
    
     
 
 
 
Where    
    
   is the excess return on the market portfolio,    is assumed to be an 
independent and normally distributed random variable and the intercept    is expected to be 
zero if the CAPM holds. Consistent with the CAPM, they find a linear relationship between 
excess returns and beta values. However, for the high-beta portfolios the intercept was 
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negative and for the low-beta portfolios the intercept was positive. Moreover, the intercept 
and slope of the portfolios varies over time. These findings are inconsistent with the CAPM 
and the BJS’s explanation is the unrealistic assumption mentioned above that investors can 
borrow and lend at the risk-free rate. Since this assumption does not hold in practice, investors 
use more risky assets to substitute leverage and therefore stocks with high (low) beta values 
have lower (higher) required return than predicted by the CAPM. 
     Frazzini and Pedersen (2010) point out that “many mutual fund families offer balanced 
funds where the “normal” fund may invest 40% in long-term bonds and 60% in stocks, 
whereas as the “aggressive” fund invests 10% in bonds and 90% in stocks” (page. 2). Hence, 
if these funds want to increase their risk, one way is to reallocate their investments to assets 
with high beta values. In line with BJS, they argue that restricted borrowing flattens the 
security market line. Moreover, they augment BJS’s findings further by constructing a 
portfolio with a long position in low beta assets and a short position in high beta assets. 
Furthermore, they use a risk-free asset to adjust the portfolio’s overall beta to zero. They find 
that this betting-against-beta portfolio generates Fama-French abnormal returns of 0.69 
percent per month with a t-statistic of 6.55 for U.S. stocks.  
2.8 LIMITS OF ARBITRAGE 
In the financial theory, arbitrage is generally described as an event where an investor makes 
money without taking on risk and without any initial capital. Simply explained, the 
arbitrageur makes an almost simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or essentially the 
same security on two different markets with a surplus as result. 
      Shleifer and Wishny (1997) points out that this view is not confirmed by professional 
investors, which states that an arbitrageur is both risky and requires capital. This may also be 
the reason why the number of professional arbitrageurs is very limited, and why they usually 
use other people’s money to make their investments. Numerous academics argue that the 
existence of arbitrageurs in financial markets is favorable because they minimize possible 
mispricing of listed securities. 
     However, Shleifer and Vishny argue that arbitrageurs’ ability to bring efficiency to 
security markets is limited. They describe a situation when the arbitrageurs are constrained 
because the investors are withdrawing their money from the fund, due to recent failures in 
capturing expected returns for arbitrage. These withdrawals tend to occur when the 
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arbitrageur is in the most crucial need of capital to regain control of their position and to not 
lose more money (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
     The constrained flexibility to recover their positions is therefore limiting their role as 
creators of market efficiency. This failure is particularly prominent in extreme circumstances, 
when prices are far out of line and arbitrageurs are fully invested. They are therefore unable to 
keep their position and have to exit the market. However, because of this kind of fire sales 
security prices may diverge even more from their fundamental prices (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  
 
2.9 JENSEN’S ALPHA AND THE SHARPE-RATIO 
2.9.1 JENSEN’S ALPHA 
Until Jensen (1967) presented his alpha constant, later known as Jensen’s alpha, financial 
theories lacked tools to measure the performance of risky investments. Jensen expressed two 
major dimensions of portfolio performance. First, he considered fund managers’ ability to 
outperform the market by successfully predicting future security prices. Secondly, Jensen 
considered the fund managers’ ability to minimize risk, through diversified allocation of 
investments. Hence, Jensen was interested in the manager’s individual skill relative to the 
market. To clarify, the word performance in Jensen’s findings is used to embrace a fund 
manager’s ability to forecast future movements in the market and not the mean-variance 
efficiency of the fund’s portfolio. Jensen uses the same regression as BJS (equation 19) but 
applied it to fund returns instead of stock returns (however, Jensen’s alpha was developed 
before BJS’s article).   
 
(20)                      
    
          
    
     
 
 
 
The    is supposed to capture any effect of skill. If a fund manager consistently beats the 
market, the excess returns will be higher than the risk premium for systematic risk and the 
intercept will therefore be positive. The error term   
 
is expected to be zero and independent.  
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2.9.2 THE SHARPE RATIO 
Sharpe (1966) tested the relationship between volatility and return on 34 mutual funds. He 
developed a ratio, later known as the Sharpe ratio, which measures the excess return relative 
to the risk exposure for a given portfolio. This ratio can be used to compare the performance 
of different funds. The original Sharpe ratio was formulated as:         
 
(21)                                
        
     
   
 
Where    is the risk-free rate and    the return of the portfolio in consideration. 
2.10 FUND MANAGER’S HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE 
Fama and French (2010) finds evidence that the fund industry on average performed in line 
with the market portfolio before expenses, for the period 1984 to 2006. Hence, the funds 
underperformed the market portfolio by approximately the managing expense. Fama and 
French continue to discuss if differences in fund performance is attributed to luck or skill. 
They find that skill is most likely not the prominent factor and concludes that it is often the 
result of other factors. They also mention that fund managers delivered better results when the 
number of funds, and consequently the competition, was low. Another explanation given by 
Fama and French is that a successful fund manager often enrolls other positions with greater 
benefits. However, Cuthbertson et al. (2008) find strong evidence that previous poor 
performers will continue to underperform. Blake and Timmermann (1998) points out that the 
research has a survivorship bias because some funds “die”, which is often believed to be the 
bad performing funds. However, they find that 89 percent of the UK funds graded as “dead” 
were merged with other funds and superior performance is as likely to be the reason for the 
merger. In effect, only 11 percent of the “dead” funds were closed down.  
     French (2008) studies how much investors pay in fees for the prospect of beating the 
market, by investing in actively managed funds instead of investing in the market portfolio. 
The market portfolio is according to the CAPM the most efficient investment strategy when 
assuming market efficiency to be justifiable (Sharpe, 1964). However, French (2008) makes it 
simpler and probably more realistic by looking at passively managed mutual funds instead of 
the market portfolio. Further, French shows that the average difference between an active and 
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a passive investment strategy was 0.67 percent annually, from 1980 to 2006. This is 
significantly lower then the extra fee an investor pays for actively managed funds.  
2.11 AGENCY PROBLEMS AND ASSET PRICING 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which a 
principal engage an agent to perform some service on their behalf, which implies decision-
making authority. The agency theory puts considerations to the issues that occur when an 
agent’s actions is not fully aligned with the principal’s interest. The principal can mitigate the 
divergences of interest by suitable incentive programs to the agent. The cost of the agency 
problem is defined as the sum of; monitoring expenditure, bonding expense by the agent and 
the residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
     Chevalier and Ellison (1997) points out that there is an agency problem between investors 
in mutual funds (principals) and the mutual fund managers (agents). The firm that operates the 
mutual fund wants to maximize its profits and the fund managers act on behalf of the firm. 
The investor in the mutual fund wants to maximize their risk-adjusted return. When these two 
objectives do not coincide there is an agency problem since investors cannot directly observe 
the information that the fund managers possess and how it is used. Hence, it is difficult for the 
investors to monitor whether or not the fund managers are striving to maximize risk-adjusted 
return or if they pursue their own interests. Chevalier and Ellison only discuss the agency 
problem for mutual funds, but we argue that the same underlying problem exists in all sorts of 
investment management. 
     Chevalier and Ellison also point out that mutual fund companies are compensated based on 
a percentage of assets under management and that this gives them an incentive to maximize 
the size of the fund. Moreover, they find a somewhat convex relationship between inflow to 
funds and year-end portfolio returns subtracted by the market return. As a result, fund 
managers have an incentive to increase the variance of returns since this will maximize their 
expected compensation, provided that these benefits are greater than the expected cost of bad 
reputation by producing lower risk-adjusted returns. Chevalier and Ellison argue that this 
incentive is the greatest for funds that towards the end of the year is trailing behind its peers in 
terms of return. In an empirical study they find that total standard deviation and the 
unsystematic risk of funds with this incentive structure increase between September and 
December. However, they do not find statistical significant results for an increase in 
systematic risk. 
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     Sirri and Tufano (1998) find a more distinct convex relationship between fund inflows and 
past performance. However, they use a ranking procedure, where the funds’ return are 
compared to the other funds in the sample, as the proxy for fund performance. Figure 1, 
provides the relationship between fund inflow and past performance in their sample. Sirri and 
Tufano also perform a piecewise regression and find support for the convex relationship. 
When performing the same piecewise regression with past raw returns they find similar 
results, even when including Jensen’s alpha as an explanatory variable.  
 
Figure 1 – Fund Inflows and Past Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sirri & Tufano (1998), with permission from the authors. 
 
Moreover, Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) use a method similar to Sirri and Tufano’s 
(1998) and find that the relationship between performance and inflows are convex for hedge 
funds as well. 
     From section 2.10, one can conclude that the results ought to be similar when using fund 
returns compared to market returns and fund returns compared to the fund industry since the 
fund industry’s return before cost on average follows the market return. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) argue that fund investors focus on past realized returns instead of the Sharpe-ratio 
when choosing which funds to invest in and that this explains the convexity. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) point out that investors evaluate the performance compared to the other funds, 
therefore the return of a fund relative to its competitors ought to determine fund inflows. To 
summarize, there is empirical support for that fund managers face a convex shaped 
relationship between their performance and fund inflows. This leads to an incentive for fund 
managers to increase the variance of their returns in order to maximize their expected 
compensation.  
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     Brennan and Li (2008) links the agency problems of fund manager to asset pricing and 
points out that the assumption of utility maximizing individuals (as expressed in equation 1) 
may not be valid anymore. The fraction of stocks held by households decreased from 
approximately 85 percent in the mid-1960’s to approximately 35 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, 
the fraction of stocks held by funds has increased dramatically. The fraction of domestic 
institutions did account for 49 percent in 2008 (Brennan and Li, 2008). This development is 
illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – US Common Stock Holdings
 
Source: Brennan & Li (2008), with permission from the authors. 
 
As discussed above, fund managers’ preferences for securities may differ from individual 
investors due to agency problems. Therefore, Brennan and Li (2008) argue that the demand 
for securities ought to diverge from traditional asset pricing models such as the CAPM when 
fund managers become more dominant in the market. Provided that individual investors 
cannot exploit this fully, as in section 2.8, the changes in demand will be reflected in security 
prices.  
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3. PROPOSITIONS FOR ASSET PRICING  
So far, we have presented research that indicates a convex relationship between recent fund 
returns and fund inflows. Hence, the benefit for funds that outperform their peers to a certain 
degree is greater than the cost for those funds that trail behind by the same degree. This leads 
to an incentive for fund managers to increase the variance of their returns. In effect, they 
ought to take on more risk than individual investors prefer since it is hard to monitor the 
information the fund possess and how it is used. We have also presented arguments for that 
fund managers’ preferences should be reflected in stock prices because of their increasingly 
large share of the market. 
      In this section we will develop theoretical arguments that builds on the theory presented 
above to show that the incentive to increase variance is greater when the risk-free rate is low. 
We will also suggest various ways in which fund managers can increase variance. Lastly, 
from these two discussions, three propositions will be deduced regarding the return on the 
stock market. 
     In order to develop the propositions, a few assumptions are necessary; (1) A fund’s 
compensation is proportional to its assets under management. (2) There is a convex 
relationship between fund inflows and recent returns relative to other funds. (3) Fund 
managers have to decrease the Sharpe-ratio of their portfolio in order to increase variance. (4) 
To some point, the increased expected compensation from increasing variance exceeds the 
expected reputation costs the fund may incur from a low Sharpe-ratio. (5) Fund managers’ 
preferences do impact the preferences of the representative investor. 
     The purpose of assumption 1 and 2 is to establish the convex relationship between fund 
compensation and its returns, which creates an incentive to increase variance as discussed 
above. From assumption 3 and 4, it follows that fund managers should act on the incentive to 
increase variance, deviating from their investors’ preferences. From assumption 5, it follows 
that fund managers’ preferences impact the equilibrium returns. 
     Assumption 1 is borrowed from Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and since many firms have 
performance based compensation systems it is not true. However, due to its option like nature, 
performance based compensation is likely to increase this convexity and since all funds do not 
have performance based compensation, the effect is excluded from the analysis. Assumption 2 
derives from the empirical findings presented in section 2.11. 
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     Assumption 3 follows from Frazzini and Pedersen’s (2010) observation that most fund 
managers are restricted from using leverage. Assumption 4 derives from the arguments 
presented in section 2.11 that investors primarily focus on return instead of the Sharpe-ratio. 
Assumption 5 derives from Brennan and Lis’ (2008) discussion.  Under assumption 1-5, the 
market does not consist of individuals that maximize their utility of future consumption. 
Instead, the utility maximizing individuals are mixed with profit maximizing fund managers 
with an incentive to increase variance.   
3.1 FUND MANAGER INCENTIVE AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
Next, we examine the incentive to increase variance further and how a low risk-free rate 
affects this incentive. This is demonstrated by a simplified example: 
 Consider a fund manager that can choose between two portfolios in time t. 
 The portfolio returns are divided into a risk-free component (    
 
) and a risk premium 
(    
 ). In effect, the portfolio returns are represented by: 
     
      
      
  
 In the short-run,    is assumed to be constant. In effect,   
      
 
 
 In t+1,     
  only have two possible outcomes for each portfolio, one up state (    
  ) 
and one down state (    
  ), the two states are equally probable. We will now drop the 
time-script notation and let the subscript represent the portfolio. 
 For Portfolio 1 (  ),   
      and   
     . This result in expected risk premium 
and variance of:     
     ,      
      
 For Portfolio 2 (  ),   
       and   
     . This result in expected risk premium 
and variance of:     
     ,      
       
 The relationship between the fund’s compensation and    is convex as established by 
assumption 1 and 2 and illustrated in figure 3.  
 Consider two states of risk-free rate:       and        
 
The mean-variance structure of the portfolios is established by assumption 3, in order to 
increase variance, the fund manager has to decrease the return per unit of variance. However, 
our example is somewhat extreme where the fund manager cannot increase return at all by 
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increasing variance, the purpose of this is to simplify and make the example more distinct. 
The fund’s expected compensation for the two different portfolios is illustrated in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 – Fund Compensation and Portfolio Return 
 
 
Due to the convexity of the slope, expected compensation is greater for portfolio 2 since it has 
a greater dispersion around its mean. In effect, portfolio 2 is the most attractive choice for the 
fund manager. For the risk-averse investor, portfolio 1 is obviously more appealing than 
portfolio 2 since the portfolios have the same expected return and portfolio 1 has lower 
variance. The return of the two portfolios during the two states of the risk-free rate is 
calculated in table 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d2 d1 u2u1
E(C1)
E(C2)
E(ri)
Compensation (C)
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 Table 1. 
Example Illustrating Fund Manager Incentives 
 Portfolio 
       
      
    
            
             
      
             
             
  
       
     
            
              
       
             
              
  
 
The distance between the expected return and the up/down state are presented in table 2 as the 
bolded number within the bracket:  
 
 Table 2. 
Example Illustrating Fund Manager Incentives 
 Portfolio 
       
           
     ,   
                  
     ,   
              
           
      ,   
                    
      ,   
               
 
From table 2, one can conclude that the dispersion around the expected return increase, and 
that the effect from choosing portfolio 2 is greater when the risk-free rate is low. This effect is 
also illustrated in figure 4 and figure 5. 
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Figure 4 – Fund Compensation and Portfolio Return, Low Risk-Free Rate
 
Figure 5 – Funds Compensation and Portfolio Return, High Risk-Free Rate
 
d2 d1 u2u1
E(C1)
E(C2)
E(ri)
Compensation (C)
ri
Compensation (C)
rid2 d1 u2u1
E(C2)
E(C1)
E(ri)
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When studying figure 4 and figure 5 one might argue that when the risk-free rate is low, 
      should move to the left on the x-axis. That is true, but remember that the relationship 
between fund inflows and returns depend on the performance relative to the rest of the fund 
industry, as argued by Sirri and Tufano (1998). Therefore, the graphed relationship should 
also shift to the left. In order to make the results more comparable, the scale of the x-axis is 
adjusted to keep       in the same position. 
      The difference in expected compensation      between the two portfolios is clearly 
greater when the risk-free rate is low. Hence, we conclude that the benefit from increasing 
variance is greater for the fund when the risk-free rate is low. The Sharpe-ratio from section 
2.9.2 is presented in table 3 for both portfolios in both states. 
 
 Table 3. 
Example Illustrating Fund Manager Incentives 
 Portfolio 
       
           
   
     
     
    
     
              
   
     
       
    
     
 
The Sharpe-ratio is the same for both portfolios regardless of the risk-free rate. Therefore, the 
adverse effect for the investor (or residual cost as in section 2.11) is the same for both states 
of the risk-free rate when the fund manager choose portfolio 2. As established by assumption 
4, the fund manager can decrease the Sharpe-ratio to some extent before the expected 
reputation cost from a lower Sharpe-ratio exceeds the benefit from increased expected 
compensation. The benefit will exceed the costs to a greater extent when the risk-free rate is 
low, since a marginal increase in variance will contribute more to expected compensation. 
Therefore, the incentive for fund managers is greater when the risk-free rate is low.  
     One insight from the numerical example is that given assumption 1-5, expected 
compensation increase with the dispersion of returns relative to the expected return. This can 
be represented by the coefficient of variation (        )), which we will use in order to 
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generalize our theoretical argument. For the generalized theoretical argument we keep 
assumption 1-5 and add the following assumptions: 
 The return of a portfolio is still characterized by:          
 Changes in the risk premium is independent of the risk-free rate: 
   
   
    
 To increase variance, the fund manager has to decrease the Sharpe-ratio 
 Expected compensation increase when the return’s coefficient of variation increase: 
                
                
   
 Expected reputation cost increase when the Sharpe-ratio decreases. To make the 
comparison with expected compensation more intuitive, we invert the Sharpe-ratio: 
                   
                
   
 In the short-run,    is assumed to be constant. Moreover,    can be either high or low 
Since the risk-free rate is constant in the short-run: 
 
(22)                             
 
Portfolio returns are higher when the risk-free rate is high. Hence, for a given level of 
variance, the increase of the coefficient of variance for a marginal increase of variance must 
be greater when the risk-free rate is low: 
 
(23)  
                
       
 
      
  
                
       
 
       
   
 
Since the risk premium is independent of the risk-free rate, the inverted Sharpe-ratio must be 
independent of the risk-free rate: 
 
(24)  
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Therefore, the following relationship must hold:  
 
(25)                   
                
       
 
      
  
                
       
 
      
  
                
       
 
       
  
                
       
 
       
 
 
Hence, the difference between the increase in expected compensation and the increase in 
expected reputation cost, for a marginal increase of variance, must be greater when the risk-
free rate is low: 
 
(26)              
        
       
 
      
  
            
       
 
      
  
        
       
 
       
  
            
       
 
       
 
 
If fund managers increase variance until: 
 
(27)               
        
       
   
            
       
  
 
Then the equilibrium level of variance will be greater for low levels of   . 
 
3.2 WAYS FOR FUND MANAGERS TO INCREASE VARIANCE       
To see how the incentive structure presented above might affect stock returns, the various 
ways in which fund managers can increase variance is examined. In this section we use 
equation 19 to describe the return of a fund’s portfolio but move    to the right hand side of 
the equation and denote excess return on the market portfolio as   : 
 
(28)        
    
            
 
 
 
In line with the discussion in section 2.5 we accept Merton’s (1980) claim that the risk 
premium ought to be independent of the risk-free rate, but we would like to explicitly state 
that this assumes a utility maximizing individual as the representative investor. Moreover, we 
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assume that fund managers cannot outperform the market, (in line with section 2.10) resulting 
in a    of 0 and we continue to assume that    is independent and normally distributed. 
Hence, the variance of returns can be expressed as: 
 
(29)                          
 
              
 
This expression is derived in Appendix 1.  
To identify how fund managers can increase the variance of their portfolios and how it relates 
to the stock market, we divide the funds’ investments into two portfolios; investments in the 
stock market and investments in other markets. Using equation 28 and assuming that    is 
zero, the total return of the two portfolios is: 
 
(30)                                                  
 
Where the superscript sm refers to the stock market and the superscript om refers to other 
markets.     refers to the fraction of the fund’s total investments allocated to the stock 
market portfolio and     to the fraction invested in the other markets portfolio.      is the 
beta value for the stock market portfolio and     is the beta value for the other markets 
portfolio. Markowitz (1952) shows that the variance of two securities combined (which also 
applies for two portfolios) is: 
  
(31)                                           
 
Where      is the covariance between the securities x and y. Substituting equation 29 into 
equation 31 the variance of a fund’s portfolio is: 
 
(32)                                                                            
 
 Gardtman & Svensson 
 
28 
 
Where     refers to the systematic risk of the stock market portfolio and     refers to the 
systematic risk of the other markets portfolio.         refers to the idiosyncratic risk of the 
stock market portfolio and         refers to idiosyncratic risk of the other markets portfolio. 
       refers to the covariance between stock market portfolio and the other markets 
portfolio. We impose the following restrictions on equation 32:  
     
               ,                    
        
 
Given equation 32 and its restrictions, the four most effective methods for fund managers to 
increase variance is to; (1) allocate a greater fraction of investments to the stock market, (2) 
increase the beta value of the stock market portfolio, (3) increase expected volatility of     
and (4) increase the covariance between the two portfolios. We will focus on the three first 
methods. 
3.3 IMPACT ON STOCK RETURNS 
To summarize our theoretical arguments, a large fraction of the stock market participants are 
fund managers and we argue that they have an incentive to increase variance that is greater 
when the risk-free rate is low. The three main ways of doing this is to allocate a larger fraction 
of their investments to the stock market, to increase the beta value of their investments in the 
stock market and to increase investments in stocks with idiosyncratic risk. Lastly, we consider 
how this may affect the equilibrium of stock market returns. We assume that there is a 
representative investor as in section 2.3. Moreover, characteristic 4 in section 2.3 establish 
that the preferences of the representative investor is a function of the preferences of each 
actual investor. Since a large fraction of the market consists of funds, the fund managers’ 
preferences ought to have a great impact on the preferences of the representative investor, this 
is also in line with Brennan and Lis’ (2008) discussion. From the discussion regarding fund 
managers’ incentives, the various ways to pursue these incentive and their impact on the 
equilibrium of stock returns we derive the following propositions:  
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3.4 PROPOSITION 1 – RISK AVERSION AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
The demand for stocks will be higher when the risk-free rate is low, since fund managers will 
allocate a larger fraction of their investments to the stock market in order to increase the 
variance of return. The variance increases both through a higher degree of systematic risk and 
a higher degree of idiosyncratic risk, as established by the restrictions on equation 32. This 
reflects a lower risk aversion in the stock market. 
3.5 PROPOSITION 2 – SYSTEMATIC RISK AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
The return of high beta stocks will be lower when the risk-free rate is low, since fund 
managers will allocate a greater fraction of their stock market investments to high-beta stocks 
in order to increase the variance of return. The variance is increased through increasing 
exposure to systematic risk, as established by the restriction on equation 32.  
3.6 PROPOSITION 3 – IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
The return of stocks with high idiosyncratic risk will be lower when the risk-free rate is low, 
since fund managers will allocate a greater fraction of their stock market investments to 
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, in order to increase the variance of the return. Due to time 
constraints, we will leave this proposition to be tested in future research.  
4. PROPOSITION 1 – RISK AVERSION AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
4.1 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In order to test proposition 1, the BGZ time series of risk aversion estimates is used. The 
series contain 172 estimates for the period 1990, January to 2004, April. As discussed in 
section 2.4, the time series is an estimation of stochastic volatility risk premium in the option 
market and we argue that this has two weaknesses. Firstly, the leap from stochastic volatility 
risk premium to risk aversion requires the assumptions described in section 2.4. Moreover, the 
stochastic volatility risk premium is derived through GMM estimations. Hence, our statistical 
analysis will be performed on a sample that is derived from statistical analysis. In effect, the 
data representing risk aversion are estimates, not precise observations. 
      Secondly, the time series reflect risk aversion in the option market and the participants in 
this market may not have the same incentive as the ones in the stock market. For example, 
many fund managers are constrained from investing in the option market. Our proposition 
builds on the assumption that fund manager’s incentives differ from mean-variance 
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maximizing investors and the BGZ estimations may not capture this effect if there are limits 
of arbitrage (as discussed in section 2.8) between these markets. Nevertheless, the BGZ 
observations are the best estimates of risk aversion in the stock market that we possess.  
     We start by performing a time series regression with the risk-free rate as an explanatory 
variable for risk aversion, assuming that the risk-free rate is exogenous. Throughout the rest 
of this thesis, the risk-free rate will be defined as the return on the three-month Treasury Bill. 
When performing an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test the p-value is 0.67 and the null 
hypothesis that the risk-free rate has a unit root cannot be rejected, in effect, the risk-free rate 
appears to be non-stationary. For the first difference of the risk-free rate (Δ  
 
) the p-value 
becomes zero for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and therefore    
 
 is used in our 
regressions. For the BGZ time series, the null hypothesis has a p-value of 0.0065 in the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test so no adjustment is necessary.  
     In line with De Boef and Keele (2008), we want to start without any restrictions on the 
regression that cannot be supported by theory. Since it is costly to restructure a fund’s 
portfolio, changes in risk aversion cannot be assumed to occur instantly when the incentive to 
increase variance changes, therefore four lags of Δ   
 
 is included in our regression. 
Additionally, the relationship ought to be non-linear since the incentive to increase variance is 
greater when the risk-free rate is low. Therefore, Δ  
 
-squared is included in the regression. 
Moreover, we include an ARMA (2,2) model in the regression to capture the effect of 
previous values of risk aversion and previous residuals.  
 
(33)             
         
         
         
         
                  
                                       
 
We start out with equation 33 and then remove the variables with the highest p-value step-by-
step until we are left with only significant estimations. The results of the first regression are 
presented in table 4.  
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None of the Δ  
 
 parameters are close to significant but the Δ  
 
-squared has a fairly low p-
value. However, when gradually removing the least significant estimates, one is left with an 
AR(2) process. 
     Due to the suspected non-linearity, we want to test the relationship between risk aversion 
and the risk-free rate during different levels of the risk-free rate. To do this, we divide the 
observations of risk aversion into three categories based on the levels of the risk-free rate at 
the time. We arbitrarily choose the thresholds for the different categories but try to achieve a 
somewhat equal number of observations in each group. 
      When the risk-free rate is below 3.5 percent the observation is sorted into the category 
low, which include 53 observations. This differs from how a low risk-free rate is categorized 
in proposition 2 below where the threshold is 3 percent. We would like to use the threshold 3 
percent as in proposition 2 but this would only yield 38 observations for proposition 1, which 
is undesirable. When the risk-free rate is between 3.5 and 5 percent the observation is sorted 
into the category medium, which include 51 observations. When the risk-free rate is above 5 
percent the observation is sorted into the category high, which include 68 observations. The 
small sample for the different categories is not very desirable, but until more estimates are 
provided this sample will have to do. Summary statistics for the three samples are presented 
in table 5. 
 
Table 4  
Risk Aversion, ARMA (2,2) and  Δrf 
Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability 
  1.7379 9.2276 0.0000 
  1(Δrf) 0.0361 0.3941 0.6940 
  2(Δrf-1) -0.0138 -0.1136 0.9097 
  3(Δrf-2) -0.0065 -0.0481 0.9617 
  4(Δrf-3) 0.0286 0.2344 0.8150 
  5(Δrf-4) 0.0044 0.5331 0.5948 
  6(Δrf
 2) 0.1744 1.5620 0.1203 
  7(AR,1) 1.5009 6.1168 0.0000 
  8(AR,2) -0.5766 -2.6224 0.0096 
  9(MA,1) -0.1723 -0.6645 0.5073 
  10(MA,2) -0.0221 -0.1524 0.8791 
Adj. R-squared 0.9042 
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Table 5 
 Risk Aversion During 
Different States of rf 
Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
  Risk Aversion  
 Interest Level High rf Low rf Medium rf 
 Mean  1.9389  1.5120  1.9267 
 Median  2.0138  1.4140  1.8957 
 Maximum  2.9481  2.7777  3.0675 
 Minimum  0.1670 -0.2455  0.6373 
 Std. Dev.  0.7862  0.6327  0.6828 
 Skewness -0.6331 -0.3843 -0.1542 
 Kurtosis  2.3939  4.3587  2.1352 
    
 Jarque-Bera  5.5830  5.3812  1.7911 
 Probability  0.0613  0.0678  0.4084 
    
 Sum  131.8438  80.1341  98.2639 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  41.4138  20.8154  23.3120 
    
 Observations  68  53  51 
 
Interestingly, the mean risk aversion is considerably lower for the group with a low risk-free 
rate and this is in line with our proposition. The median is also lower for this group, which 
indicates that the difference in mean is not explained by outliers. However, we need to test 
whether or not the difference is statistically significant. Since the samples do not have equal 
variance we use Welch’s t-test (Welch, 1951). To perform this test we have to assume that 
risk aversion is normally distributed. This may be a bold assumption considering the 
histogram for the total sample in figure 6.  
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Figure 6 – Histogram of Risk Aversion Estimates 
 
Nevertheless one cannot reject that the sample is normally distributed at a 10 percent 
significance level using a Jarque-Bera test. We test if the mean risk aversion in the low 
category is lower than the medium and high category by performing two separate tests. The 
results are presented in table 6.  
 
Table 6 
Total Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
Risk Aversion, Welch s Equality of mean 
Group             p-value 
High and Low Group 0.0012 
Medium and Low Group 0.0018 
  
The null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected with 1 percent significance in both tests. 
Hence, we conclude that risk aversion is lower when the risk-free rate is low. 
     Furthermore, we want to examine how the risk-free rate affects risk aversion when the 
risk-free rate is low. When testing if changes in the risk-free rate impact risk aversion with 
independent variables that was assumed to be linear in their parameters, we could not find a 
significant relationship. However, when studying figure 7, 8 and 9, there appear to be a 
somewhat linear relationship between risk aversion and the risk-free rate for the low group, 
the relationship then disappear for the other groups.  
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Figure 7 – Risk Aversion Estimates and the Risk-Free Rate 
 
 
Figure 8 – Risk Aversion Estimates and the Risk-Free Rate 
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Figure 9 –Risk Aversion Estimates and the Risk-Free Rate
 
 
Therefore, we construct a regression with an interaction term for a dummy variable (low) and 
Δ  
 
. The dummy variable equals 1 when the risk-free rate is below 3.5 percent and equals 0 
otherwise. From table 4 it is evident that an AR(2) process describe a large part of the 
movements in risk aversion. Consequently the AR(2) process is also included in the 
regression, which result in:  
 
(34)                  
                     
 
Hence, the first difference of the risk-free rate is modeled to affect risk aversion in the 
following way: 
 
(35)             
   
     
 
 
  
        
      
       
      
  
 
From proposition 1,    is expected to be positive since risk aversion should increase as the 
risk-free rate increase. However, the interaction term is far from statistically significant (table 
7).  
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Table 7  
Risk Aversion, AR(2) and Interaction Dummy for rf  
Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability 
  1.7531 8.6861 0.0000 
  1(low*Δrf) -0.0554 -0.5736 0.5670 
  2(AR,1) 1.3556 19.8193 0.0000 
  3(AR,2) -0.4399 -6.4216 0.0000 
Adj. R-squared 0.9098 
 
We perform one last test by removing the interaction term but keeping the dummy variable. 
One might suggest that we are getting close to data mining at this point, but we think that the 
tests are in line with the argumentation presented in section 3: 
 
(36)                                            
 
The dummy variable should be interpreted as the difference in the intercept when the risk-free 
rate is low compared to when it is not (Wooldridge, 2003, page 220). Hence, the dummy 
variable should take on a negative value to support proposition 1. The results are presented in 
table 8. 
 
Table 8 
 Risk Aversion, AR(2) and Dummy Variable for Low rf 
Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability 
  1.7292 8.3497 0.0000 
  1(low) 0.0704 0.8689 0.3861 
  2(AR,1) 1.3629 19.9913 0.0000 
  3(AR,2) -0.4458 -6.5286 0.0000 
Adj. R-squared 0.9100 
 
The dummy variable is far from significant. When studying the graphed residuals in figure 10, 
one significant outlier can be identified in August, 2002.  
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Figure 10 – Residuals for Regression 36 
 
 
In order to test if excluding the outlier would improve the results, we create a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for the data point (AUG02DUM). In effect, the observation is excluded from the 
sample (Brooks, 2008, page 166). Excluding the outlier does not improve the results 
considerably (table 9) and therefore no indication on how the risk-free rate affects risk 
aversion is found. 
 
Table 9 
 Risk Aversion, AR(2) and Dummy Variable for Low rf, 
Excl.Outlier 
Sample Size: 172 
Period: 1990, January to 2004, April 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability 
  1.7255 8.5440 0.0000 
  1(low) 0.0751 0.9954 0.3210 
  2(AUG02DUM) 0.4955 4.1995 0.0000 
  3(AR,1) 1.4111 21.139 0.0000 
  4(AR,2) -0.4921 -7.3624 0.0000 
Adj. R-squared 0.9181 
 
4.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The findings that the risk aversion is lower when the risk-free rate is low does support 
proposition 1. However, one has to consider the initial discussion in section 4.1, the sample is 
not observations of risk aversion from the stock market. Instead, the sample consists of 
estimates of risk aversion derived from the option market. On the other hand, we argue that 
the imperfection in our proxy for risk aversion does motivate the crude method of comparing 
the means of the subgroups. The estimation errors in each subgroup probably cancel out each 
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other to some extent when calculating the mean. Moreover, the imperfection of the estimates 
might explain why we cannot find an OLS regression that describes how the risk-free rate 
affects risk aversion. If there is a relationship between the true risk aversion and the risk-free 
rate, estimation errors in our proxy might distort this relationship and ruin the possibility to 
find how the risk-free rate affects risk aversion.  
     Another likely explanation is that the functional form for the relationship differs from the 
ones in our regressions. The mean risk aversion is significantly lower when the risk-free rate 
is low, but the difference between the high and the medium group is fairly low. This indicates 
a non-linear relationship, and although the non-linear relationships included in our regressions 
did not manage to produce significant results, there are many other possible non-linear 
relationships that have not been tested. For example, it would be useful to include the natural 
logarithm of the risk-free rate as a parameter in the OLS regression. Moreover, if a 
relationship that is linear in the parameter cannot be found, a non-linear regression model may 
be required to identify the relationship.  
5. PROPOSITION 2 – SYSTEMATIC RISK AND THE RISK-FREE RATE 
5.1 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
To examine the risk-free rate’s effect on the cross-section of stock returns we follow BJS’s 
procedure with some modifications. Daily and monthly stock prices between 1980 and 2012 
for the NYSE have been gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Initially the database 
stated that the number of listed companies was 2,712, but we could only retrieve 1,749 stocks 
for an unknown reason. Hence, it is hard to say if the omitted data will contribute to any bias. 
Then daily and monthly arithmetic returns where calculated from the stock prices.  
     One bias introduced by the data is that the returns for the stocks are not adjusted for 
dividends. This results in understated returns for companies with high dividends relative to 
companies with low dividends. Another bias is that we only have historical data for the stocks 
that were listed as of 2013-04-04. In effect, stocks that have been delisted during the period 
are not included. This results in a survivorship bias. Similar to Blake and Timmerman’s 
(1998) discussion of survivorship bias in the fund industry, there are two main reasons for that 
stocks are delisted; bankruptcy or that it has been acquired by another company. Therefore, 
both well and bad performing firms might be excluded from the sample. The market 
portfolio’s return is defined as the NYSE Composite Price Index, which is the value weighted 
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return on the NYSE without adjustments for dividends. The reason why we started in 1980 is 
that the expansion of the fund industry intensified around that year (as illustrated in figure 2 
above).  
 
Table 10 - Number of Stocks in Portfolios by Year 
Year Number of Stocks* Year Number of Stocks* 
1980 476 1997 919 
1981 491 1998 966 
1982 507 1999 1 001 
1983 517 2000 1 046 
1984 534 2001 1 075 
1985 548 2002 1 119 
1986 568 2003 1 143 
1987 598 2004 1 175 
1988 620 2005 1 236 
1989 639 2006 1 295 
1990 649 2007 1 344 
1991 665 2008 1 423 
1992 691 2009 1 454 
1993 729 2010 1 486 
1994 783 2011 1 561 
1995 828 2012 1 633 
1996 876 
*Total number of stocks, divided equally into 10 portfolios. The stocks are divided as follows, e.g. year 1980: Portfolio 1-9 contains of 47 stocks  each 
and portfolio 10 contains of 47+6=53 stocks. Consequently portfolio 10 contains some more observations for every year. 
 
In line with BJS we divide the stocks into 10 portfolios based on the ranking of their beta, in 
order to reduce the problem of cross-sectionally dependent residuals in the time series test. 
Also in line with BJS, stocks are sorted into the portfolios based on beta values estimated 
from a preceding period, in order to reduce the regression to mean phenomenon. Portfolio 1 is 
the portfolio with the lowest beta and portfolio 10 is the one with the highest beta. BJS use 
monthly returns for the five preceding years to calculate the beta values, we choose daily 
returns in the preceding year instead since the higher sample frequency provides more precise 
estimates of variance (Merton, 1980). Therefore, more precise estimates of covariance is 
achieved with higher sample frequency.  
     To calculate excess return for the market portfolio and for individual stocks, we subtract  
                from the daily return, where      is the annualized interest rate for 
three-month Treasury Bills. The monthly excess return of each portfolio is defined as the 
equally-weighted average return of the stocks, subtracted by               . The choice 
of equally weighted average return is in line with BJS and Fama and French (1996). The 
portfolios are updated every year and result in a time series of monthly excess returns for the 
10 portfolios between 1981 and 2012. Many of the observations in portfolio 1 are stocks that 
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have not been traded during the year, which results in a beta value of 0. Some stocks with 
extremely negative beta values are also included in portfolio 1 and for some years, stocks with 
extremely high beta values are included in portfolio 10. Therefore, one should be cautious 
when interpreting the results of these portfolios. After this procedure, we replicate BJS’s time 
series regression for each portfolio:  
 
(37)       
    
          
    
     
 
 
 
If the CAPM accurately describe stock returns, then the intercept is expected to be zero for all 
portfolios. The results for the regressions are presented in table 11. 
  
Table 11  
Portfolio Excess Return and Market Excess Return 
Sample Size: 384 
Period: 1981, January to 2012, December 
Portfolio Number 
Item P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
  ● 102 5.6313 0.4323 0.3881 0.4285 0.3606 0.2900 0.5033 0.3977 0.2394 0.6011 
t    1.3792 2.6833 2.9811 2.9843 2.5808 1.7424 3.3091 2.5817 1.4759 2.5294 
p    0.1686 0.0076 0.0031 0.0030 0.0102 0.0822 0.0010 0.0102 0.1408 0.0118 
   -1.2462 0.6035 0.7315 0.7947 0.9202 0.9746 1.1033 1.2014 1.2540 1.5166 
t(  ) -0.8044 11.0663 15.2617 17.9623 16.3131 19.6164 18.4101 16.3395 18.8313 15.3136 
p(  ) 0.4217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.0032 0.4779 0.6688 0.6693 0.7063 0.6764 0.7419 0.7336 0.7443 0.6654 
     With Newey-West fixed std. error 
 
When performing White’s test for hetroscedasticity, the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
rejected with a significance level of 0.05 for the f-test for most portfolios. Moreover, when 
performing a Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation with 10 lags, the assumption of 
uncorrelated residuals is also rejected with a 0.05 significance level for most of the portfolios. 
To prevent incorrect inference regarding the significance of the estimated parameters, we use 
the Newey-West procedure to modify the estimations of the standard errors (Brooks, 2008, 
152). This is also in line with Merton (1980), who argues that when estimating parameters for 
realized returns, the results should be adjusted for hetroscedasticity since the variance of 
market returns are not constant.  
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     An Augmented Dickey-Fuller test allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the NYSE 
returns are non-stationary with a significance level of 0.01. The Bera-Jarque test is used to test 
if the residuals are normally distributed for the portfolios. The test rejects the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are normally distributed at a 0.01 significance level for all portfolios. The 
non-normality of the residuals will be discussed in section 5.2. The estimated parameters for 
portfolio 1 are nonsensical, the beta value is estimated to -1.24 without statistical significance 
and the adjusted R-squared for the regression is only 0.0058, as mentioned earlier the quality 
of the data in this portfolio is weak so we do not put any effort into interpreting its results 
throughout the rest of this thesis.  
     To examine whether or not the risk-free rate affect stocks with different betas in different 
ways, the first difference of the risk-free rate is added as an independent variable to the BJS 
regression. We continue to assume that excess returns on the market portfolio are independent 
of the risk-free rate. If our proposition holds, including Δ  
 
 will pull the intercept towards 0 
and increase the adjusted R-squared for the high-beta portfolios and the effects diminish for 
lower-beta portfolios. 
      If the excess return on the market portfolio is not independent of the risk-free rate (as 
discussed in section 2.5), multicollinearity will exist and the OLS regression cannot be used to 
test our proposition. However, the correlation between excess return on the NYSE and the 
first difference of the risk-free rate is only -0.08, in effect, their movements appear to be 
independent of each other. As discussed earlier, fund managers should not be able to instantly 
reallocate their portfolios when the risk-free rate decrease and therefore we include four lags 
of Δ  
 
. Moreover, since the incentive is greater during periods of low risk-free rate and 
decrease as the risk-free rate increase, the relationship may be non-linear and therefore    
  
 
is included:   
 
(38)         
    
       
    
    
          
         
         
         
  
                                             
     
 
 
 
For every portfolio we run the regression with four lags and    
  
, then the estimates with 
highest p-value are gradually removed. We continue to use White’s test for hetroscedasticity 
and the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation with 10 lags. The regressions for the 
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portfolios appear to have both hetroscedastic and autocorrelated residuals and therefore the 
Newey-West procedure are used to modify the estimated standard errors as in the previous 
regression. At a 0.05 significance level, this result in statistical significance for the third lag in 
portfolio 2, portfolio 3, portfolio 4 and portfolio 5, these results are presented in table 12.  
 
Table 12. 
 Portfolio Excess Return, Market Excess Return and rf 
Sample Size: 384 
Period: 1981, January to 2012, December 
Portfolio Number 
Item P2 P3 P4 P5 
  ● 102 0.3836 0.3397 0.3843 0.3014 
t    2.4067 2.7468 2.7741 2.2773 
p    0.0166 0.0063 0.0058 0.0233 
  1 0.6092 0.7348 0.7985 0.9243 
t(  1) 11.2852 15.3389 17.9853 16.2330 
p(  1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  4 ● 10
2(Δrf-3) -0.6739 -0.6354 -0.6579 -0.7491 
t(  4) -2.8306 -2.2107 -2.5024 -2.6660 
p(  4) 0.0049 0.0277 0.0128 0.0080 
Adj. R-squared 0.4880 0.6773 0.6750 0.7138 
           With Newey-West fixed std. error 
 
Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera test rejects that the residuals are normally distributed for all 
portfolios at a significance level of 0.01. As mentioned above, this problem will be discussed 
in section 5.2. In order to focus on the effect of a low risk-free rate, we use the BJS regression 
and add a dummy variable for when the risk-free rate is below 3 percent (low), which 
corresponds to 113 of our 384 observations: 
 
(39)               
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The results are presented in table 13.  
 
Table 13 
Portfolio Excess Return, Market Excess Return and Dummy Variable for Low rf (3%) 
Sample size: 384 
Period: 1981, January to 2012, December 
Portfolio Number 
Item P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
  ● 102 2.1062 0.2125 0.1702 0.1925 0.1614 0.0847 0.3001 0.1432 -0.0444 0.1904 
t    2.1518 1.0878 1.1139 1.1267 0.9740 0.4079 1.7604 0.9567 -0.2782 0.8048 
p    0.0320 0.2774 0.2660 0.2606 0.3307 0.6836 0.0791 0.3394 0.7810 0.4214 
  1 -1.1907 0.6070 0.7349 0.7984 0.9233 0.9779 1.1065 1.2054 1.2584 1.5230 
t(  1) -0.8015 10.9610 14.9068 17.4078 15.8719 19.0646 17.9777 16.0671 18.4720 15.1263 
p(  1) 0.4234 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  2(low) 0.1192 0.0074 0.0074 0.0080 0.0067 0.0069 0.0069 0.0086 0.0096 0.0139 
t(  2) 1.0560 2.3679 2.7463 2.6992 2.1284 2.0069 1.7393 1.8591 2.0761 2.0392 
p(  2) 0.2917 0.0184 0.0063 0.0073 0.0339 0.0455 0.0828 0.0638 0.0386 0.0421 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.0064 0.4844 0.6753 0.6757 0.7096 0.6792 0.7444 0.7370 0.7484 0.6706 
With Newey-West fixed std. error 
 
As for previous regressions White’s test for hetroscedasticity and Breusch-Godfrey for 
autocorrelation with 10 lags is used. Most portfolios appear to have hetroscedastic and 
autocorrelated residuals, therefore the Newey-West procedure is used as before. After this 
correction, the dummy variable is significant at a 0.05 level for all portfolios except portfolio 
8 that has a p-value of 0.06 and portfolio 7 that has a p-value of 0.08. Moreover, it can be 
rejected that the residuals are normally distributed with a significance level of 0.01 using the 
Jarque-Bera test. As mentioned above, this will be discussed in section 5.2 below. Since the 
threshold for low is defined differently in proposition 1 and proposition 2, one could accuse us 
of data mining. Therefore, we have provided the results for the same regression but with 3.5 
percent as the threshold for a low risk-free rate in appendix 2. 
5.2 DISCUSSION OF NON-NORMALITY IN RESIDUALS  
In section 5.1 we could conclude that none of our tests of proposition 2 had normally 
distributed residuals. In table 14,15 and 16, the skewness and the kurtosis for the residuals are 
presented. In contrast to the normal distribution that is symmetric (Brooks, 2008, page 161), 
the skewness is positive for almost all of the portfolios and increase with the beta value. In 
effect, positive values are more likely than stated in the normal distribution. In our findings, 
we are most interested in the parameter for a low risk-free rate (the dummy variable). Since 
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this parameter is positive, the skewness of the residuals implies that the p-values from our 
OLS regressions are lower than they would be using the true distribution. In effect, the 
certainty regarding our results is weaker than stated by the p-value.  
     Moreover, the distributions of the residuals have excess kurtosis, which appears to be 
greater for the portfolios with a high beta value. The normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3 
and the excess kurtosis is therefore the kurtosis in excess of 3. This implies that the 
distribution is more peaked and has fatter tails than the normal distribution (Brooks, 2008, 
page 162). The fatter tails lead to a higher probability of extreme values. Therefore, the p-
values from our OLS regressions are too low since they assume normally distributed 
residuals. To summarize, the p-values of our parameters are too low since the residuals are 
positively skewed and has excess kurtosis. This effect is greater for the portfolios with high 
beta values.  
Table 14  
Residuals for Regression 37, Skewness and Kurtosis 
Portfolio Number 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Skewness  18.8570 -0.4175 0.5219 0.8816 1.0373 0.1964 2.1896 2.6815 2.1434 3.2617 
Kurtosis 364.4677 6.6679 8.3280 6.3531 8.9114 14.7471 15.8081 19.4551 16.4067 24.2851 
 
Table 15  
Residuals for Regression 38, Skewness and Kurtosis 
Portfolio Number 
 P2 P3 P4 P5 
Skewness  -0.4663 0.4620 0.8342 0.9715 
Kurtosis 6.6836 8.0073 6.1660 8.7423 
 
Table 16  
Residuals for Regression 39, Skewness and Kurtosis 
Portfolio Number 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Skewness  18.6949 -0.3954 0.3980 0.7484 0.9116 0.1094 2.0400 2.4340 1.8639 3.1871 
Kurtosis 360.3002 6.6422 8.0210 5.9155 8.3052 14.1888 14.8160 18.0419 15.2347 24.8656 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
When examining the results for regression 37 one can conclude that our findings are not in 
line with BJS. The intercepts are positive for all portfolios, in contrast to BJS that found a 
negative intercept for the high-beta portfolios. It can be rejected that the intercept is zero at 
0.05 significance for most of the portfolios. The positive intercept indicate that there is some 
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other risk factor that is priced by the market that is not strongly related to the systematic risk 
of stocks. The intercepts also suggest that this additional risk factor has great economic 
significance. Fama and French (1996) manages to decrease the intercepts with their three-
factor model. They make 25 regressions in their study with an average R-squared of 0.93 and 
with small intercepts just distinguishable from zero. Following from the adjusted R-squared, 
systematic risk appears to explain a fairly large part of the portfolio returns but also leaves 
much of it unexplained. The adjusted R-squared does also seem to increase with the portfolio 
beta but the relationship is far from monotonic.  
In regression 38, the third lag of the risk-free rate decrease the intercepts for portfolio 2-5, but 
it is still significantly different from 0 at a 0.05 level. The adjusted R-squared also increase 
modestly. Including the variable does not appear to alter the systematic risk’s impact on the 
portfolio returns considerably and no monotonic pattern for the intercept is evident. The 
parameter for      
 
 does not seem to depend on the beta value. 
 
Table 17 
 Difference in Parameters Between Regression 37 and 38  
Portfolio Number 
Item P2 P3 P4 P5 
  ● 102 -0.0487 -0.0484 -0.0442 -0.0592 
  1 0.0056 0.0034 0.0038 0.0041 
Adj. R-squared 0.0100 0.0084 0.0057 0.0076 
 
We find it difficult to interpret these findings and it is likely that they are part of some greater 
pattern that is not captured in the regression. 
     In regression 39, the dummy variable decreases the intercept for all portfolios. When the 
dummy is included, the intercept seem to decrease to approximately zero for the high-beta 
portfolios and the intercept is only significantly different from 0 at a 0.05 level for portfolio 1. 
However, the R-squared does not increase dramatically when the dummy variable is included.  
 
Table 18 
Difference in Parameters Between Regression 37 and 39 
Portfolio Number 
Item P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
  ● 102 -3.5251 -0.2198 -0.2179 -0.2360 -0.1992 -0.2053 -0.2032 -0.2545 -0.2838 -0.4107 
  1 0.0555 0.0035 0.0034 0.0037 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032 0.0040 0.0045 0.0065 
Adj. R-
squared 0.0031 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0033 0.0029 0.0024 0.0034 0.0041 0.0052 
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The dummy parameter is positive for all portfolios and the annualized difference in return for 
low levels of the risk-free rate is presented in table 19.  
 
Table 19  
Annualized Dummy Parameter from Regression 19 
Portfolio Number 
Item P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
(1+  2)
12
-1 2.8627 0.0925 0.0925 0.1003 0.0834 0.0860 0.0860 0.1082 0.1215 0.1802 
  2(low) 0.1192 0.0074 0.0074 0.0080 0.0067 0.0069 0.0069 0.0086 0.0096 0.0139 
 
These findings are consistent with those for regression 38, the positive dummy variables 
suggest that the returns are higher when the risk-free rate is low and the parameter in 
regression 38 suggest that excess returns decrease as the third lag of the risk-free rate 
increase, at least for low-beta portfolios. When taking the economic significance into 
consideration, our findings from regression 39 may be a bit unrealistic. According to our 
findings, the annualized excess return for portfolio 9 is 12 percentage points higher during 
periods of a risk-free rate below 3 percent. The result for portfolio 10 is even higher, but as 
mentioned above, the data for portfolio 10 might have some flaws. We cannot find a 
normative justification for that the excess return should be higher when the risk-free rate is 
low. Linking back to section 2.5, it is possible that excess return should be dependent of the 
current level of the risk free rate, in effect: 
 
              
   
    
 
This implies that excess return would be higher when the risk-free rate is low. However, this 
would also imply that the dummy variable should increase monotonically for the portfolios, 
which is not the case. Moreover, it was concluded above that the correlation between excess 
return on the NYSE index and the risk-free rate is very low in our sample. Lastly, this 
explanation would yield significant results for the risk-free rate in regression 38, In effect, the 
risk-free rate would not only impact excess returns during low levels. 
     If one wishes to create a story to motivate these findings it ought to include a 
representative investor who’s demand for stocks decrease when the risk-free rate is low. 
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However, this is the opposite of our narrative created in section 3. Instead, we suggest that 
there is another causal relationship. For example, low levels of the risk-free rate might be 
most prevalent after economic shocks. However, to examine this relationship is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. If this suggestion is correct, the relationship found between excess return 
and the risk-free rate might instead reflect the effect of economic shocks on excess returns. 
After an economic shock, uncertainty regarding the future is likely to be greater. Hence, 
volatility should be greater and following from equation 9, this result in greater excess 
returns. Moreover, a low level of the risk-free rate might be caused by monetary stimulus. The 
monetary stimulus might increase the expected cash flows for the firms, which result in high 
realized returns. However, this requires that the market participants did not anticipate the 
monetary stimulus. To study this relationship is also beyond the scope of this thesis.  
     The results may also be exaggerated by the bias created by not adjusting for dividends. 
Managers might be cautious to pay dividends after economic shocks since the future is 
uncertain. The access to capital markets might be limited, which makes a cash buffer 
desirable. This would exaggerate the difference in returns for our data since it does not 
account for dividends, which would be greater when the risk-free rate is not low. 
6. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, we have found support for that risk aversion is lower when the risk-free rate is 
below 3.5 percent. However, no significant parameter estimate for the risk-free rate was found 
in the OLS regressions performed. When replicating BJS time series regression with more 
recent data, we find that all intercepts are positive. Moreover, we find that the return of all 
portfolios is considerably higher when the risk-free rate is below 3 percent. In effect, stock 
returns appear to be higher when the risk-free rate is low, regardless of the beta value.  
     At first glance, one might conclude that combining the findings for the two propositions 
result in an incoherent picture of investor behavior. The risk aversion is lower when the risk-
free rate is low, but the stock returns increase. However, before dismissing our findings one 
ought to study equation 9 again. The increase in the stock returns can be explained by 
increased volatility, which is the causal relationship we suggested in section 5.3. This noise 
makes it hard to disentangle the demand for high-beta stocks in relation to the demand for 
low-beta stocks. In this scenario, we have not tested proposition 2 properly. However, this 
reasoning is not supported by data, research in the relationship between stock market 
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volatility and the risk-free rate would be useful to help explain the high excess return for 
when the risk-free rate is low. Moreover, proposition 1 has the benefit of being independent of 
the CAPM. As discussed in section 2.2, the CAPM is a factor pricing model in which a 
stock’s regression coefficient with the market portfolio determines the cross-section of 
returns. In table 11 it is evident that the CAPM does leave a substantial fraction of stock 
returns unexplained. Hence, the deduction of proposition 2 may rely on a misspecified 
theoretical framework.  
     Based on the findings that stock returns are higher during low risk-free rates, it seems to be 
less attractive for corporations to fund their operations from the equity market during these 
periods. If this is due to greater volatility, it ought to be reflected in their cost of debt as well 
and the corporations would have to accept higher funding costs during these periods. 
However, if this is due to a anomaly in the stock market, it would be wise for corporations to 
avoid funding their operations through equity issues during periods of a low risk-free rate. 
     It is important to keep in mind that even though the findings are in line with proposition 1, 
this does not prove that fund managers deviate from their investors’ interests and 
consequentially increase the risk of their portfolios in order to maximize their own 
compensation. The findings do indeed support our theoretical arguments, which were 
developed before the tests were conducted. As far as we know, our proposition is currently the 
best explanation for the phenomena observed in the data. If one is willing to conceive that risk 
aversion decrease when the risk-free rate is low, due to an increased incentive for fund 
managers to take on excessive risk, we point out two practical implications.  
     Firstly, fund investors should be aware of the increased agency problem in order to 
monitor the fund managers more carefully during periods of a low risk-free rate. Although 
French’s (2010) research show that it would be wise for investors to avoid actively managed 
mutual funds altogether, the reason to avoid them appears to be stronger during periods of a 
low risk-free rate. Secondly, monetary policymakers ought to take the findings into 
consideration when forecasting the consequences of their monetary policy decisions. As 
mentioned above, the proxy for risk aversion is derived from option prices and under a no-
arbitrage assumption this should be a good proxy for risk aversion in the entire financial 
market. Hence, the expansionary monetary policies currently conducted in the developed 
countries should have consequences for the risk appetite in the financial market.  
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     As mentioned above, further research in the relationship between the risk-free rate and 
stock market volatility would be useful in order to provide understanding for why the excess 
returns are greater when the risk-free rate is low. Moreover, it would be interesting to test if 
the effect of the risk-free rate remains in the Fama and French three-factor model. In addition, 
further econometric work is necessary to find a more precise description for how the risk-free 
rate affects risk aversion.  Finally, it would be interesting to see empirical tests of proposition 
3, perhaps by using the framework of Ang et al. (2006) and adding the dummy variable for a 
low risk-free rate used in proposition 2.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Derivation of variance of returns  
                 
Assume that    is zero. Assume    is independently normally distributed, therefore its 
covariance with    and    is zero. Lastly assume that the risk premium is uncorrelated with 
the risk-free rate. In effect: 
 
        ,        ,        ,         
 
Therefore, the variance of portfolio returns is: 
                              
 
For a given level of    the variance of the portfolio becomes: 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table 20  
Portfolio Excess Return, Market Excess Return and Dummy Variable for Low rf (3.5%) 
Sample size: 384 
Period: 1981, January to 2012, December 
Portfolio Number 
Item P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
  ● 102 1.5543 0.1743 0.1742 0.1865 0.1247 0.0372 0.2736 0.1091 -0.1593 0.1216 
t    1.8029 0.8384 1.0788 1.0463 0.7140 0.1685 1.5382 0.6865 -1.0074 0.4834 
p    0.0722 0.4023 0.2814 0.2961 0.4757 0.8663 0.1248 0.4928 0.3144 0.6291 
  1 -1.1895 0.6071 0.7345 0.7980 0.9235 0.9782 1.1065 1.2054 1.2595 1.5232 
t(  1) -0.7968 11.0002 15.0079 17.5111 15.9177 19.1336 18.0518 16.1104 18.5540 15.1559 
p(  1) 0.4261 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  2(low) 0.1181 0.0075 0.0062 0.0070 0.0068 0.0073 0.0067 0.0084 0.0115 0.0139 
t(  2) 1.2255 2.5164 2.4389 2.4902 2.3059 2.2588 1.8516 2.0323 2.8703 2.2846 
p(  2) 0.2211 0.0123 0.0152 0.0132 0.0217 0.0245 0.0649 0.0428 0.0043 0.0229 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.0067 0.4852 0.6736 0.6745 0.7101 0.6800 0.7444 0.7371 0.7511 0.6711 
With Newey-West fixed std. error 
 
Looking at the historical data for the risk-free rate during the period of our sample we found a 
threshold of 3 percent to be appropriate for a low risk-free rate since this constitute 
approximately one-third of the sample. But due to lack of observations qualified to this group 
we decided to use a threshold of 3.5 percent when studying the smaller sample in proposition 
1. One might accuse us for data mining and therefore we made the regression for proposition 
2 including the higher threshold as used in proposition 1. The results were even slightly more 
significant using the lower level of the risk-free rate. A comparison between the two 
regressions shows that the p-value for the 3 percent “dummy” is significant at a 0.05 percent 
level for all portfolios except 1 and 7. This is better than for the 3.5 percent level, in which 
portfolio 1, 7 and 8 were insignificant at the 0.05 level. There is no substantial difference 
when comparing the intercepts, the coefficient estimates or the pattern across the different 
beta portfolios. The adjusted R-square’s does also appear to be almost unaffected by this 
modification. 
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APPENDIX 3 – ARTICLE WRITTEN FOR A SWEDISH BUSINESS PAPER 
Fondförvaltarna riskerar investerarnas besparingar för egen vinning 
    ”Lägre räntor ökar risktagandet på aktiemarknaden” 
En allt större del av dagens sparande placeras i aktiefonder, vilket gjort fondförvaltarna till den 
enskilt största aktören på aktiemarknaden. Spararna placerar sina pengar i fonder av flera 
anledningar. Diversifiering och en tro på att fondförvaltarnas skicklighet ska ge dem en bra 
avkastning är förmodligen två av de mest centrala motiven.  Detta trots att girighet och höga bonusar 
har skamfilat finansbranschen mer än en gång tidigare. Författarna har studerat närmare hur 
förändringar i den riskfria räntan påverkar riskaptiten på aktiemarknaden. 
           
               1 706 bolag på New York Stock Exchange och deras utveckling sedan 1980 ingår i studien.               Foto: Daniel Gardtman 
 
Inspirationen till studien är hämtad från 
Raghuram Rajan som menar att risken på de 
finansiella marknaderna ökat kraftigt under 
de senaste decennierna och pekar på ett 
samband med den allt större närvaron från 
fondförvaltare. Det finns en stark enhällighet 
bland forskare om att fondförvaltarnas 
kompensationsprogram leder till ett Agent-
Principalproblem gentemot dess investerare. 
Möjligheten till hög kompensation för 
förvaltarna gör att de inte alltid tar beslut 
som bäst matchar investerarnas preferenser. 
De riskerar alltså investerarnas besparingar 
för egen vinning. 
Våra resultat visar på att i tider med låg 
riskfri ränta ökar risktagandet på 
aktiemarknaden. Vi illustrerar detta med en 
figur som visar på sambandet mellan 
fondförvaltarnas kompensation och olika 
nivåer av fondavkastning.   
Tidigare studier visar på att desto mindre 
insyn investerarna har, desto högre är 
incitamentet för fondförvaltarna att öka 
risken i fonden. Spararna bör därför öka 
kraven på transparens vad gäller fondernas 
risktagande.   
Våra 
slutsatser 
angående 
den riskfria 
räntans 
påverkan på 
aktiemarkna
den bör tas 
på högsta 
allvar. 
Beaktning bör tas av beslutsfattare så som, 
räntedelegationen på riskbanken och när nya 
regleringar införs inom fondmarknaden.
Compensation
Rid2 d1 μ u2u1
μ (C2)
μ (C1)
Compensation
d2 d1 μ u2u1
μ (C1)
μ (C2)
Ri
Grafiken till höger 
visar det konvexa 
sambandet mellan en 
fonds avkastning och 
dess kompensation. 
Anmärkningsvärt är att 
förväntad 
kompensation är högre 
för de förvaltare som 
tar högre risk. Detta 
samband förstärks 
ytterligare under 
perioder med låga 
riskfria räntor.
 
